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Abstract
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents
gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of
resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving to the other location decreases as more
agents move there. The agents do not observe the resource level at the other location while
a principal does and the principal would like to carefully release this information to attract a
proper number of agents to move. We adopt the Bayesian persuasion framework and analyze
the principal’s optimal signaling mechanism design problem. We study both private and public
signaling mechanisms. For private signaling, we show the optimal mechanism can be computed in
polynomial time with respect to the number of agents. Obtaining the optimal private mechanism
involves two steps: first, solve a linear program to get the marginal probability each agent
should be recommended to move; second, sample the moving agents satisfying the marginal
probabilities with a sequential sampling procedure. For public signaling, we show the sender
preferred equilibrium has a simple threshold structure and the optimal public mechanism with
respect to the sender preferred equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. We support
our analytical results with numerical computations that show the optimal private and public
signaling mechanisms achieve substantially higher social welfare compared with no information
or full information benchmarks in many settings.
1 Introduction
We study information design in the spatial resource competition settings, where a group of agents
migrate across a network of locations, competing for stochastic time-varying resources at each
location. This setting characterizes many real world scenarios: on crowd-sourced transportation
platforms, drivers migrate across different neighborhoods of a city, competing for ride demands;
in unskilled labor markets, workers migrate across different cities for more job opportunities; in
nomadic animal husbandry, pastoralists migrate across different range lands, competing for water
and pastures, etc.
In these scenarios, information about other locations largely affects an agent’s decision about
whether to leave her current location, and where to explore. However, such information is usually
limited or even unavailable to the agents. Meanwhile, in many cases, there is a principal who has
access to more information than any individual agent, e.g., platforms such as Uber and Lyft in
the ride sharing market, or the government agencies in labor markets, or non-profits in the case
of pastoralists. Using this information, the principal can influence the decisions of the migrating
agents, better locate them and improve the total social welfare. For example, Uber and Lyft show
the demand trend at different neighborhoods as a heatmap to the drivers [31] in order to locate them
to areas with higher demands, and government agencies provide information about employment and
job openings in various sectors.
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However, sharing information may not always bring higher welfare, if the information is not
released in a careful way: if a sports match or a concert at a stadium is about to finish and Uber
informs every available driver in the nearby area, too many drivers may flood to this area, with
many of them failing to find a customer due to over-supply. In such cases, it might be wiser for the
platform to only inform a particular group of drivers to better match supply and demand. How
to choose such a group? More generally, spatial resource competition scenarios typically exhibit
negative externalities. In presence of such negative externalities, how should a principal effectively
communicate her information to the agents in order to better position them?
Answering this question for a large network of locations is challenging: the effect of a signal
that attracts a group of agents to a particular location may percolate across the entire network
through agents’ subsequent migration. On the other hand, signals can take very complicated forms
in large networks, depending on many factors, including the number of locations and agents, the
dynamics at each location, and the agents’ belief about the state of the system and other agents’
strategies. With the goal of obtaining insights to this spatial information design problem while
retaining a tractable analysis, we consider a two-location model, which serves as a foundation for
more complicated analysis.
1.1 Overview of Model and Main Results
We consider a model with 2 locations, `0, `1, and N agents. Initially, all the agents are at `0, and
must decide whether to move to `1, which has a stochastic resource. The utility each agent receives
upon moving to `1 depends on the stochastic resource level at `1, as well as how many other agents
move there. The agents do not know the resource level at `1 while a principal can observe it. The
principal would like to design a mechanism to share this information to the agents in order to attract
a proper number of agents to move to `1.
We adopt the framework of Bayesian persuasion [22, 28] to study this information design problem.
The principal’s goal is to choose a signaling mechanism that maximizes the expected social welfare,
i.e., the total expected utility of the agents. In this work, we consider both private signaling
mechanisms, where the principal sends personalized signals to each agent privately, as well as public
signaling mechanisms, where the principal sends the same information to all the agents.
The standard approach using a revelation-principle style argument [9] to find the optimal private
signaling mechanism leads to a linear program in 2N variables, rendering the computation challenging.
Instead, our first main result in Section 3 characterizes a computationally efficient two-step approach
to find the optimal private signaling mechanism. First, we perform a change-of-variables and
instead of the signaling mechanism, we focus on the marginal probabilities pik that an agent i is
recommended to move to `1 along with k − 1 other agents, for each i and k. We show that the
marginal probabilities {pik}i,k corresponding to the optimal private signaling mechanism can be
found by solving a linear program in O(N2) variables. Then, we describe an efficient sampling
procedure that samples sets of agents according to the the optimal marginal probabilities {pik}i,k.
The optimal private signaling mechanism then asks the sampled set of agents to move to `1 and the
rest to stay at `0. Finally, we provide a condition on the model parameters under which the optimal
signaling mechanism has a simple threshold structure and can be computed in O(logN) time.
Although private signaling mechanisms provide the principal more flexibility, a number of
practical concerns often render private mechanisms infeasible [17, 25, 12]. First, private mechanisms
make the strong assumption of no ”information leakage” among the agents, i.e., the agents do not
share their personalized information with each other. This assumption may easily fail in practice.
Furthermore, fairness considerations may prevent a principal from sharing different information
with different agents; a fair-minded principal may even seek to avoid the semblance of providing
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conflicting information to different agents.
Owing to these reasons, in Section 4, we analyze the problem of finding the optimal public
signaling mechanism, where the principal shares the same information with all the agents. To
do this, we first characterize the equilibria of the incomplete information game among the agents
subsequent to receiving any public signal. While the equilibrium set is quite complex, we show that
for any common posterior belief of the agents, the equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare has
a simple threshold structure. Using this result, we show that the optimal public signaling mechanism
can be found as a solution to a linear program with O(N) variables and constraints. Furthermore,
we show that the optimal mechanism only randomizes over two signals.
Finally, we numerically investigate the performance of the optimal private and public signaling
mechanisms, and show that these achieve substantially higher social welfare than the no-information
or full-information mechanisms.
The main point of departure of our work from past literature on information design is the
modeling of negative externality among the agents. Past work on information design has focused
mainly on settings with no externalities [17] or settings where there is positive externalities among
the agents [12, 11]. In such settings, correlation among the agents’ choice of action is beneficial,
whereas the main challenge in our work is in de-correlating the agents’ actions. This is especially
challenging under public signaling, where public signals naturally tend to correlate the agents’
actions.
To conclude this section, we note that our approach for finding the optimal private signaling
mechanism is not restricted to our model, but applies more broadly to settings where an agents’
utility upon taking the action depends on the number of agents who take that action. Thus, our
results on the computation of the optimal private signaling mechanism might be of independent
interest to the research community.
1.2 Related Work
Our work focuses on information design in a resource competition scenario, adopting the Bayesian
persuasion framework. We briefly survey here the related works on information design and Bayesian
persuasion.
Information design problems on how a sender should persuade one or more receivers date back
to [20] and [27]. The two mainstream frameworks studying this problem is the Bayesian persuasion
framework, originating from [22, 28] and the “cheap talk” model [14, 18], where the main difference
is the former assumes the signal sender has the power to commit to a particular information sharing
mechanism.
[22] studies the basic setting with one sender and one receiver. [29, 8, 26] considers the more
general “one sender, many receivers” setting and provide unified frameworks of deriving the optimal
mechanism in such general settings. [19] considers a setting where multiple senders wish to influence
one receiver.
For general “one sender, many receivers” information sharing settings, tractable computation of
the optimal mechanism remains an open problem. A lot of works have studied various special cases.
[4, 2, 17] considered the simplest scenario: each receiver’s action imposes no externalities on other
agents. [3, 4, 2] characterize polynomial time computable optimal mechanisms when the sender’s
utility is supermodular or anonymous submodular. [17] provide an (1− 1/e) optimal mechanism
for general submodular sender utilities. For more general settings where agents’ payoffs depend on
other agents’ actions, [2] provides polynomial time computable optimal mechanism for binary action
settings when the sender’s utility is supermodular, and similar result is given in [12, 11]. Both works
point out that the optimal policy correlates recommendations to take the positive action as much as
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possible. Our work considers resource competition in settings where agents’ actions have negative
externalities, and to the best of our knowledge, is the first to study such settings.
Information design and Bayesian persuasion are studied in many other settings, including voting
[32, 1, 6], ad auction [5], online retailing [25, 15], bilateral trade [7], advertising [13], security
games [34], customer queues with delays [24], Stackelberg competition between firms [33] and team
formation [21], etc. A more thorough review of this topic can be found in [16]. Beyond the one-time
persuasion setting considered in most of the work we listed, several other works [10, 23] considered
the problem of sequentially persuading a group of agents.
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Model
We consider a model with N agents, a principal, and 2 locations, denoted by `0 and `1. Initially, all
the agents are at location `0. There is a stochastic resource at `1, with the resource level denoted by
θ. We primarily focus on the binary setting, with θ ∈ Θ , {0, 1} capturing the presence or absence
of a resource; our model can be extended to the case where Θ is a finite set. Without observing θ,
each agent at `0 independently decides whether or not to move to `1, where she obtains a utility
that depends on θ, as well as the number of other agents who also choose to move to `1. In addition,
we assume that each agent incurs a moving cost if she moves to `1.
Formally, each agent i ∈ [N ] simultaneously chooses an action ai ∈ {0, 1}, where ai = 0 implies
the agent chooses to stay at `0 and ai = 1 implies she chooses to move to `1. Let a = (ai, a−i) denote
the profile of actions chosen by all the agents, and A , {0, 1}N denote the set of action profiles.
Note that for any a ∈ A, the number of agents that choose to move to `1 is given by n(a) =
∑N
i=1 ai.
Then, for any action profile a and any resource level θ, an agent i’s utility, Ui : Θ×A→ R, is given
by
Ui(θ, a) =
{
θ · F
(∑N
j=1 aj
)
− r(i), if ai = 1;
0, if ai = 0.
Here, F : [N ] → R+ is the resource sharing function that determines how the resource at `1 is
shared among the agents at `1, and r(i) denotes agent i’s moving cost. In particular, an agent i
who chooses to move to `1 receives an utility of θF (n(a)) from the resource, and incurs a cost r(i)
for moving. Furthermore, we have normalized the utility of staying at `0 to be zero. Without loss
of generality, we assume that r(i) is increasing in i, i.e., r(1) ≤ r(2) ≤ · · · r(N). For notational
convenience, in the following, we let r(0) = 0 and F (0) = F (1).
We make the following assumptions on the resource sharing function F :
Assumption 1. The resource sharing function F (n) is decreasing and convex in n ≥ 1. Furthermore,
the total utility from the resource nF (n) is increasing and concave in n ≥ 0.
The first condition is meant to capture the fact that in most resource sharing settings, the
amount of resource each agent receives decreases as competition increases, with the decrement
diminishing with the level of competition due to market saturation. On the other hand, the second
condition captures the fact that as the competition increases, the total level of resource available to
the agents also increases, albeit also at a diminishing rate. This is especially common in platform
markets, where the presence of more agents on one side leads to better service quality for the other
side of the market, leading to more conversion.
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2.2 Information structure
We assume that the principal and the agents hold a common prior belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ) about the
resource level θ, where µ(1) denotes the prior probability that θ = 1, and µ(0) = 1− µ(1). While
the resource level θ is unobserved by the agents, we assume that the principal observes θ prior to
the agents’ choice of actions. The principal’s goal is to communicate this information about θ to the
agents prior to their moving decision, in order to better position them at the two locations. (We
describe the principal’s objectives in more detail below.)
Following the methodology of Bayesian persuasion, the principal commits to a signaling mech-
anism as a means to share information with the agents. Formally, a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ)
consists of a signal set Σ and a signaling scheme φ : Θ → ∆(ΣN ). Given a signaling mecha-
nism (Σ, φ) and upon observing the resource level θ, the principal first chooses a signal profile
s = (s1, · · · , sN ) ∈ ΣN with probability φ(s|θ) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the principal (privately) reveals the
signal si to agent i. In particular, si is not revealed to an agent j 6= i.
Note that φ(s|θ) denotes the conditional probability that the signal profile is s, given the
resource level is θ. In particular, we have
∑
s∈ΣN φ(s|θ) = 1 for each θ ∈ Θ. Analogously, we define
φ(θ, s) = µ(θ)φ(s|θ) to be the unconditional joint probability that the signal profile is s and the
resource level is θ. Finally, we let φ(s) denote the probability of the principal selecting the signal
profile s ∈ ΣN , given by φ(s) = φ(0, s) + φ(1, s).
A special case of a signaling mechanism is a public signaling mechanism, where the principal
publicly announces the information about θ to all the agents. In other words, the principal always
shares the same information with all the agents. Such public signaling can be captured by a signaling
mechanism (Σ, φ) where φ(s|θ) = 0 for any s ∈ ΣN with si 6= sj for some i, j ∈ [N ]. Finally, we
refer to any signaling mechanism that is not public as a private signaling mechanism.
2.3 Strategies and equilibrium
Since an agent i does not have access to the signals of the other agents, she maintains a belief over
both the resource level θ and the signals s−i of the other agents. Upon receiving her signal si from
the principal, the agent updates her belief using Bayes’ rule, before deciding whether to move. Let
qi(·|si) denote posterior belief of agent i about the resource level and the signals sent to other agents,
given by
qi(θ, s−i|si) = µ(θ)φ(si, s−i|θ)∑
θ′,s′−i
µ(θ′)φ(si, s′−i|θ′)
. (1)
A strategy pi : Σ→ [0, 1] for agent i specifies, for each possible signal si, the probability pi(si) with
which she decides to move to location `1. Each agent, given her posterior belief and the strategies
p−i of the other agents, seeks to choose a strategy pi that maximizes her expected utility. More
precisely, given a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ) and the strategies p−i of the other agents, the expected
utility of an agent i for moving to location `1 upon receiving a signal si is given by
ui(si,move, p−i) = Eqi [Ui(θ, ai = 1, a−i)|a−i ∼ p−i(s−i)],
Then, in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each agent i, upon receiving a signal si, decides to move to `1 if
her expected utility ui(si,move, p−i) is positive. We have the following formal definition:
Definition 1. Given a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ), a strategy profile (p1, . . . , pN ) forms a Bayes-
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Nash equilibrium (BNE), if for each i ∈ [N ] and si ∈ Σ,
pi(si) =
{
1 if ui(si,move, p−i) > 0;
0 if ui(si,move, p−i) < 0.
(If ui(si,move, p−i) = 0, then pi(si) ∈ [0, 1].)
As mentioned earlier, the principal’s goal is to choose a signaling mechanism to maximize the
expected social welfare. Formally, the social welfare W : Θ×A→ R is defined as
W (θ, a) , θ · n(a) · F (n(a))−
N∑
j=1
ajr(j).
Here the first term denotes the total utility obtained by the n(a) =
∑N
j=1 aj agents from the resource
at `1, and the second term denotes the total moving costs incurred by the agents. We assume that
the principal knows the agents’ moving costs. Then, the principal’s decision problem is to choose a
signaling mechanism (Σ, φ) such that in a resulting Bayes-Nash equilibrium (p1, · · · , pN ) among
the agents, the expected social welfare, given by E[W (θ, a)|ai ∼ pi(si), (θ, s) ∼ φ], is maximized.
In the next section, we study the problem of computation of the optimal signaling mechanism
and characterize its structure. Subsequently, in Section 4, we analyze the related problem of
optimal public signaling, where the principal is restricted to sharing information via public signaling
mechanisms.
3 Private Signaling Mechanism
From a standard revelation-principle style argument [22, 9], there exists a straightforward and
persuasive signaling mechanism that optimizes the expected social welfare. In a straightforward
mechanism, the principal makes an action recommendation to each agent, and if it is optimal for
each agent to follow the recommendation (assuming all others do so), then the mechanism is said
to be persuasive. Thus, to obtain an optimal private mechanism, it is sufficient to restrict our
attention to persuasive straightforward mechanisms. This implies that it suffices for the principal to
determine the subset of agents to recommend to move for each resource level.
For θ = 0, 1 and S ⊆ [N ], let φ(S|θ) be the probability of recommending the set S of agents to
move to `1, given resource level θ. We abuse the notation to let
W (θ, S) , θ|S|F (|S|)−
∑
i∈S
r(i)
be the social welfare when resource level is θ and agents in S move to `1. The optimal signaling
scheme φ is then obtained as solution to the following linear program:
max
φ
∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|θ)W (θ, S) (2)
s.t.
∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S:i∈S
φ(S|θ)(θF (|S|)− r(i)) ≥ 0, i ∈ [N ], (3)
(LP.1)
∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S:i/∈S
φ(S|θ)(θF (|S|+ 1)− r(i)) ≤ 0, i ∈ [N ], (4)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|θ) = 1, θ = 0, 1,
φ(S|θ) ≥ 0, θ = 0, 1;S ⊆ [N ].
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The first two sets of constraints ensure φ is persuasive: the first constraint states that any agent i
who is recommended to move to `1 must have non-negative utility for moving, whereas the second
constraint states that any agent i who is recommended to stay must have non-positive utility for
moving. The other constraints ensure that φ(·|θ) is a valid probability distribution for both θ = 0, 1.
Note that this linear program has O(2N ) variables, and is computationally challenging. As a first
step towards simplifying the problem, we note the following lemma, which allows us to only consider
mechanisms that recommend all agent to stay at `0 when θ = 0.
Lemma 1. For any persuasive mechanism, there exists another persuasive mechanism that recom-
mends every agent to stay at `0 when θ = 0, and achieves a higher social welfare than the original
mechanism.
We provide proofs of all results in Appendix A. Although Lemma 1 reduces the size of (LP.1)
by half, this linear program is still computationally challenging. However, taking a closer look at
each agent’s utility function, we notice that each agent i’s payoff for moving when θ = 1 depends
only on how many other agents are moving. With this observation, we now consider an alternative
formulation of (LP.1).
Given a persuasive signaling scheme φ satisfying Lemma 1, i.e., φ(∅|0) = 1, we define pik to be
the joint probability, given θ = 1, that this signaling scheme recommends k agents to move and
agent i is among them, i.e.,
pik =
∑
S
φ(S|1) · I{i ∈ S, |S| = k}. (5)
The following lemma allows us to write the objective and persuasive constraints of (LP.1) in terms
of p = {pik : i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [N ]}.
Lemma 2. The objective (2) of (LP.1) can be written as
µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik(F (k)− r(i)),
and the persuasive constraints (3), (4) can be written as
N∑
k=1
pik(F (k)− r(i)) ≥ 0, i ∈ [N ], (6)
N−1∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk − pik
 (F (k + 1)− r(i))
+
1− N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk
 (F (1)− r(i)) ≤ µ(0)
µ(1)
r(i), i ∈ [N ]. (7)
Our main result in this section shows the converse is also true: given p = {pik > 0 : i ∈ [N ], k ∈
[N ]} satisfying persuasive constraints (6) and (7), with a few more linear constraints ensuring the
pik’s are valid joint probabilities, there exists a persuasive signaling scheme φ satisfying Lemma 1
such that (5) holds. Furthermore, there exists a polynomial time sequential sampling procedure
that samples the set of agents to recommend to move as per the signaling scheme φ.
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Lemma 3. Assume p = {pik > 0 : i, k ∈ [N ]} satisfies the persuasive constraints (6) and (7). If p
further satisfies
N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
i=1
pik ≤ 1, (8)
kpik ≤
N∑
j=1
pjk, k ∈ [N ], i ∈ [N ], (9)
then there exists a persuasive signaling scheme φ such that φ(∅|0) = 1 and φ(·|1) satisfies (5).
Note that if pik is the joint probability that k agents are recommended to move to `1 and agent
i is among them, then qk , 1k
∑N
i=1 pik is the probability that k agents are recommended to move.
Upon letting q0 = 1−
∑N
k=1 qk, we note that (8) ensures {qk}Nk=0 is a valid probability distribution
over {0, . . . , N}. On the other hand, qik , pikqk =
kpik∑N
j=1 pjk
is the conditional marginal probability
that agent i is recommended to move given there are k agents asked to move, and (9) ensures
qik’s are valid probabilities. To summarize, (8) and (9) requires for each k ∈ [N ], the conditional
marginal probabilities {qik}Ni=1 are in the k-uniform matroid polytope.
We briefly describe the sketch of the proof of Lemma 3, and omit the details due to space limit.
The main idea is that there exists a sampling procedure that samples a set of agents such that
for each i, k ∈ [N ], pik is the probability that k agents are sampled and agent i is among them.
Specifically, this sampling procedure first samples the size k′ of the output set according {qk}Nk=0.
Following that, given any k′ > 0, we adopt a sequential sampling subroutine presented by [30] to
sample k′ agents. This subroutine eliminates one agent from agents 1, . . . , N at each step, and
ensures the probability a particular agent i still remains in the pool after each step is either 1, or
strictly less than 1 while proportional to pik′ . If (9) is satisfied, when N − k′ agents are eliminated,
the probability each agent i remains in the output set is ensured by this subroutine to be qik, and
the joint probability that k′ agents are sampled and agent i is included is then pik′ . We briefly
describe this subroutine in Appendix A and omit its details and proof of correctness, and refer
interested readers to [30]. We then let φ(·|1) be the probability distribution of the set sampled
according to this procedure, and note that φ(·|1) thereby satisfies (5) and the persuasive constraints.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, to obtain the optimal
private signaling mechanism, we first solve the following linear program (LP.2) to obtain the optimal
solution p∗.
max
pik:i,k∈[N ]
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik(F (k)− r(i))
s.t.
N∑
k=1
pik(F (k)− r(i)) ≥ 0, i ∈ [N ],
N−1∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk − pik
 (F (k + 1)− r(i))
(LP.2) +
1− N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk
 (F (1)− r(i)) ≤ µ(0)
µ(1)
r(i), i ∈ [N ],
N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
i=1
pik ≤ 1,
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kpik ≤
N∑
j=1
pjk, k ∈ [N ], i ∈ [N ],
pik ≥ 0, k ∈ [N ], i ∈ [N ],
After obtaining p∗, we sample the set of agents to recommend to move according to the following
procedure given in Algorithm 1. Let φ∗ be the persuasive signaling mechanism corresponding to p∗
and Algorithm 1, as given by Lemma 3. φ∗ must be feasible for (LP.1). Furthermore, the objective
corresponding to φ∗ in (LP.1) is equal to that of p∗ in (LP.2). Therefore φ∗ must be the optimal
solution to (LP.1), and is the optimal private signaling mechanism.
Note that (LP.2) has N2 variables and N2 +2N+1 constraints, therefore can be solved efficiently
in polynomial time. The sequential sampling subroutine in [30] takes at most N steps to sample
the set of agents to move, and in each step it takes polynomial time to determine which agent to
eliminate. Therefore, the entire process to obtain the set of agents to recommend to move under
the optimal private signaling mechanism can be completed in polynomial time.
Algorithm 1: Sampling the set of Agents to Move.
Input: p = {pik : i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [N ]} satisfying (8) and (9).
Output: S.
for k ← 1 to N do
qk ←
∑N
i=1 pik
k ,
q0 ← 1−
∑N
k=1 qk
Sample the size of the output set: k′, according to {qk}Nk=0.
if k′ > 0 then
Sample k′ agents from all agents, satisfying the marginals {qik′}Ni=1 in the k′-uniform
matroid polytope, where qik′ =
pik′
qk′
.
Let S be the set of sampled agents.
else
S ← ∅.
We summarize our main result in this section as the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The optimal private signaling mechanism can be computed by first solving (LP.2),
then sampling the set of agents to recommend to move according to Algorithm 1.
To conclude this section, we provide an observation that under certain conditions of modeling
parameters, recommending the agents to follow the social optimal strategy profile is persuasive.
Let W˜ (n) , nF (n) − ∑ni=1 r(i) be the social welfare when θ = 1 and the first n agents
move to `1. Since nF (n) is concave and r(i) is increasing in i, W˜ (n) is also concave in n. Let
i∗ , max{i : i ∈ arg max0≤i′≤N W˜ (i′)} be the largest maximizer of W˜ . In the following proposition,
we show the strategy profile that all agents staying when θ = 0, and the first i∗ agents moving
when θ = 1, achieves the highest social welfare among all strategy profiles, and we give a sufficient
condition under which recommending the agents to follow this strategy profile is persuasive.
Proposition 1. If µ(1) ≤ r(i∗ + 1)/F (i∗ + 1), then recommending all agents to stay when θ = 0
and recommending the first i∗ agents to move when θ = 1 is an optimal persuasive mechanism.
Remark. Note that r(i∗ + 1)/F (i∗ + 1) does not depend on µ. Thus, this proposition gives an
upper bound on µ(1) for achieving the maximum possible social welfare using signaling mechanisms.
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In Appendix B we compute this upper bound for µ(1) under several typical families of resource
sharing functions and cost structures. Also, since W˜ is concave, computing for i∗ takes only O(logN)
time, reducing the computational time for the optimal mechanism substantially compared with the
general method.
4 Public Signaling Mechanism
Having characterized the optimal private signals, we next consider the principal’s problem under
the restriction that the signaling mechanism be public. One reason for studying this restriction is
that private signaling makes strong assumptions of no information leakage among the agents, an
assumption that can easily fail in practice. Public signaling by construction avoids this information
leakage concern. From a practical standpoint, restriction to public signaling can arise due to fairness
requirements, where the principal seeks to avoid the semblance of providing conflicting information
to different agents.
A main technical difficulty in analyzing public signaling is the failure of the revelation principle
argument[22, 9]: it no longer suffices to optimize only over on straightforward and persuasive public
mechanisms. To overcome this difficulty, we first note that in a public signaling mechanism, after
any information transmission from the principal, all the agents have a common belief about the
resource level θ, and participate in a Bayesian game under this common belief, where each agent
simultaneously chooses whether to move to `1. Thus, we begin our analysis of public signaling
mechanisms by first analyzing the structure of the equilibria of this Bayesian game under any
common belief of the agents.
4.1 Equilibrium structure
Subsequent to receiving a public signal, let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the common belief of the agents that
θ = 1. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the subsequent game can be represented by a strategy profile
p = (p1, · · · , pN ), where pi denotes the probability that agent i chooses to move to `1. Our goal
is to identify, for any common belief q ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium profile that achieves the highest
expected social welfare, given by W (q, p) = qE[W (1, a)|a ∼ p] = qE[n(a)F (n(a))|a ∼ p]−∑i piri.
We first note that the set of equilibria of this game can be quite complex. First, there can be a
multiplicity of equilbria for any q ∈ [0, 1], as the following example illustrates for an instance with 2
agents:
Example: Let N = 2, F (1) = 1, F (2) = 0.6, r(1) = 0.5 and r(2) = 0.6. For q ∈ [0, 0.5), the only
equilibrium is p(q) = (0, 0). For q ∈ [0.5, 0.6), the only equilibrium is p(q) = (1, 0). For q ∈ [0.6, 5/6],
there are three equilibria: p1(q) = (1, 0), p2(q) = (0, 1) and p3(q) = ((5q − 3)/2q, (10q − 5)/4q). For
q ∈ (5/6, 1), there is a unique equilibrium (1, 0) and for q = 1, there are two equilibria, (1, 0) and
(1, 1).
Secondly, as the following proposition shows, the equilibria themselves have very counterintuitive
features, where if multiple agents randomize, then the one with larger moving costs must move with
a higher probability:
Proposition 2. For an equilibrium profile (p1, . . . , pN ) under a common belief q, let Imix ⊆ [N ] be
the set of agents who randomize: Imix , {i ∈ [N ] : 0 < pi < 1}. For any agent i, j ∈ Imix where
i < j, it must be that that pi ≤ pj.
While the preceding result goes counter to the intuition that agents with higher moving cost
should be less likely to move, it is explained by the fact that in order for an agent with higher
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moving cost to be indifferent between moving and staying, it must be that she must find location `1
to be less competitive than the one with the lower moving cost, which implies that the one with the
lower moving cost must move to `1 with lower probability.
Despite the complexity of the equilibrium set, one can nevertheless consider a simple class of
equilibria, namely the threshold equilibria, defined as follows:
Definition 2. For common belief q ∈ [0, 1], an equilibrium p = (p1, · · · , pN ) is said to be a threshold
equilibrium, if there exists a t ∈ [0, N ] such that
pi =

1, if i < dte;
t+ 1− dte, if i = dte;
0, if i > dte,
where dte is the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to t. We denote such an equilibrium
by (q, t).
In a threshold equilibrium (q, t), at most one agent randomizes between moving and staying.
Furthermore, all agents i < dte move to `1, whereas all agents i > dte stay at `0. Thus, threshold
equilibria capture the intuition that agents with higher moving costs should move with lower
probability. Our first result shows that, indeed, for any q ∈ [0, 1], there exists a threshold equilibrium.
Before we state our result, we define the following quantities for any common belief q:
i(q) ,max{i ∈ {0, . . . , N} : qF (i)− r(i) ≥ 0},
i(q) ,max{i ∈ {0, . . . , N} : qF (i)− r(i) > 0}. (10)
Note that qF (i)− r(i) denotes the expected utility of agent i for moving to location `1, if all agents
j < i move to `1 and all agents j > i stay in `0. Thus, i(q) denotes the agent with the largest
moving cost who strictly prefers to move to `1, if all agents with smaller moving costs move, and
those with larger moving costs stay. Similarly, i(q) denotes the agent with the largest moving cost
who does not strictly prefer to stay, under similar choices of other agents. Moreover, since F (i) is
decreasing in i and r(i) is increasing in i, we have i(q) ≥ i(q) for any belief q. Furthermore, since
qF (0)− r(0) ≥ 0, we have i(q) ≥ 0 and hence [i(q), i(q)] ∩ [0, N ] 6= ∅. We have the following result:
Lemma 4. For any q ∈ [0, 1], and any t ∈ [0, N ], (q, t) is a threshold equilibrium if and only if
t ∈ [i(q), i(q)].
The preceding lemma guarantees the existence of threshold equilibria. The question then is
how do threshold equilibria fare against other equilibria in terms of their expected social welfare.
The following result, our main theorem of this section, establishes that for any common belief, the
expected social welfare over all equilibria is attained at a threshold equilibrium.
Theorem 2. For any common belief q ∈ [0, 1], the expected social welfare W (q, p) under any
equilibrium (q, p) is no more than that under the threshold equilibrium (q, i(q)):
W (q, i(q)) ≥W (q, p), for any equilibrium p.
The preceding theorem has the following implications: First, the expected social welfare is
always maximized at a pure equilibrium (q, i(q)): no agent strictly randomizes between moving
and staying. Second, under the optimal public signaling mechanism (Σ, φ), for any signal s and the
induced common belief q ∈ [0, 1], it must be that the resulting equilibrium among the agents is
(q, i(q)). For otherwise, one can always (publicly) recommend the agents to move to this equilibrium
and improve the expected social welfare. In the next section, we use these two facts to completely
characterize the optimal public signaling mechanism as a solution to linear program.
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4.2 Optimal Public Signaling Mechanism
The results in the preceding section imply the following structure for the optimal public signaling
mechanism: For each θ, the principal (publicly) recommends the threshold i number of agents to
move to location `1, with the constraint that, under the induced common belief q upon receiving
the recommendation i, it must be the case that i(q) = i. This follows from an argument similar to
the revelation-principle style argument for the private signaling mechanism, with the modification
where the condition i(q) = i plays the same role of the persuasive constraints. We omit the details
due to its similarity to that of the private signaling case.
Thus, the public signaling mechanism can be described by choosing the signal set to be Σ =
{0, · · · , N} and φ : Θ→ ∆(Σ), where φ(i|θ) denotes the probability that the principal recommends
the first i agents to move to `1 when the resource level is θ. The common belief upon sending
a public signal s = i is then given by qi = µ(1)φ(i|1)/(µ(1)φ(i|1) + µ(0)φ(i|0)). The equilibrium
constraint is thus i(qi) = i for each i ∈ Σ. Note that the definition of i(q) then implies that
qiF (i)− r(i) > 0 (11)
qiF (i+ 1)− r(i+ 1) ≤ 0. (12)
Finally, the expected social welfare is given by
∑
θ=0,1 µ(θ)
∑N
i=0 φ(i|θ)W (θ, i), where W (θ, i) =
θiF (i)−∑j≤i rj . Taken together, using the fact that qi = µ(1)φ(i|1)/(µ(1)φ(i|1) + µ(0)φ(i|0)) and
letting φ(θ, i) = µ(θ)φ(i|θ), we obtain the following LP in φ:
max
φ
∑
θ=0,1
N∑
i=0
W (θ, i) · φ(θ, i)
s.t. (F (i)− r(i)) · φ(1, i)− r(i) · φ(0, i) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N};
(F (i+ 1)− r(i+ 1)) · φ(1, i)− r(i+ 1) · φ(0, i) ≤ 0, for all i ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1};∑
i=0,...,N
φ(θ, i) = µ(θ), φ(θ, i) ≥ 0, for θ = 0, 1, for all i ∈ {0, · · · , N}.
(13)
In (13), the objective is the expected social welfare under φ. The first two sets of constraints encode
(11), ensuring that each signal i indeed induces the corresponding threshold equilibrium. (Note that
since W (θ, i) is decreasing in i, the strict inequality in (11) can be replaced by the weaker inequality
without loss of optimality.) The last constraints ensure φ(·|θ) is a valid probability distribution for
each θ. Note that the preceding LP has 2(N + 1) variables and 2(N + 1) constraints, and thus can
be efficiently solved in polynomial time.
Remark. With a similar argument as that in [22], one can show the optimal public signaling
mechanism sends at most two signals with positive probabilities. That is, the optimal public
signaling mechanism randomizes over two thresholds, with different weights for θ = 0 and θ = 1.
Our results in this section can be easily extended to allow for larger state space Θ, with cardinality
any finite K. In this case, the optimal public signal is the solution to a linear program with O(NK)
number of variables and constraints, and the optimal public scheme sends at most K signals with
positive probability.
5 Computational Results
In this section, we compare numerically the social welfare under the optimal private and public
signaling mechanisms with three benchmarks: the no-information benchmark, the full-information
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(a) Constant costs: r(i) = 0.5r.
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(b) Linear costs: r(i) = 0.1ri.
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(c) Quadratic costs: r(i) = 0.02ri2.
Figure 1: Social welfare of the optimal signaling mechanisms and the benchmarks. x-axis is the cost coefficient
r, and y-axis is the social welfare of different mechanisms/benchmarks over social welfare under no information
sharing. For all cases, the total number of agents N = 20 and the prior is µ(0) = 0.2, µ(1) = 0.8.
benchmark, and the social optimal benchmark, where all agents choose the social optimal action,
that is, all agents stay when θ = 0, and the first i∗ agents move when θ = 1 and i∗ is defined earlier
as the largest maximizer of W˜ (n) = nF (n) −∑ni=1 r(i). Note the third benchmark may not be
achievable through a signaling mechanism, but rather provides an upper bound for the social welfare
any signaling mechanism can generate.
We consider three different resource sharing function F (i) = 1/iα for α = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9. The
parameter α controls the curvature of the resource sharing function, representing different resource
sharing scenarios. We consider three different cost structures, constant costs where r(i) = 0.5r, linear
costs where r(i) = 0.1ri and quadratic costs where r(i) = 0.02ri2, where r is the cost coefficient
and we vary r to represent different cost functions. We compute the social welfare of the optimal
mechanisms and the benchmarks for different resource sharing and cost functions and plot the
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results in Figure 1.
Numerical results in Figure 1 show that the optimal private signaling mechanism generates
a social welfare close to the social optimal benchmarks in most cases, and the optimal public
signaling mechanism also generates social welfare higher than the full information or no information
benchmark in most scenarios. The benefit of private signaling is high when agents have similar costs,
as illustrated by the subplots in the first column. [2] and [12] show that when agents’ actions have
positive externalities, the optimal private mechanism should correlate the recommendations to take
the positive action for every agent as much as possible. Here in our setting where agents’ actions
have negative externalities, a different phenomenon is observed: private signaling de-correlates the
agents’ recommendations and generates more expected social welfare compared to public signaling
where agents’ actions are more correlated.
In Proposition 1, we give an upper bound for µ(1) under which the social optimal benchmark
is achievable via private signaling. We also study numerically how much social welfare can be
generated when this condition does not hold, by considering different priors. We presents these
results in Appendix C.
6 Discussion
We consider information design in a two location resource competition model. For private signaling,
we provide a method to compute the optimal mechanism in polynomial time, and also characterize a
condition of model parameters under which the optimal mechanism has a simple threshold structure.
For public signaling mechanisms, we characterize the structure of the socially optimal equilibrium
and establish the form of the optimal public signaling mechanism. Numerical results show the
optimal private and public signaling mechanisms increase the social welfare substantially compared
with the no-information and full-information setting.
Readers may have noticed that our method for obtaining the optimal private signaling mechanism
does not restrict to the resource sharing setting we are considering. In fact, it is applicable to all
settings where the externality of each agent’s action is anonymous (the utility of an agent depends
only on how many other agents are taking the same action, but not on which agents are taking
this action). Formally, for information design settings with binary action spaces where receiver i’s
utility has form fi
(
ai,
∑
j 6=i aj
)
and the sender’s utility has form f (
∑
i ai) +
∑
i gi(ai), our method
can be used to obtain the optimal private signaling mechanism in polynomial time. Such utility
functions can be found in many settings, for example, in most voting settings where the sender does
not differentiate across voter.
Going beyond our model, in many spatial settings, there are more than two locations. The
form of signals and the action and belief structure of the agents can be much more complicated.
Fully solving the optimal signaling mechanism in such a system may be computationally intractable,
while it is hopeful heuristic mechanisms with theoretical guarantee or good empirical performance
on the social welfare generated may exist and is an interesting future research path. Meanwhile, in
most settings, agents migrate among locations so signaling is not “one-shot” but rather a sequential
and dynamic process, where signals sent at a time impact the actions and beliefs of agents ever
since hence affect signals that should be sent later. The Bayesian persuasion framework does not
extend naturally to these settings. Building models and analyze such dynamic signaling process is
an important future path for better understanding real world spatial signaling problems.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let φ be an arbitrary persuasive straightforward signaling scheme, where for any S ⊆ [N ], φ(S|θ) is
the probability of recommending agents in S to move, condition on resource state is θ. We construct
another straightforward signaling scheme φ′ where φ′(S|1) = φ(S|1) for all S ⊆ [N ]; φ′(∅|0) = 1
and φ′(S|0) = 0 for all S ⊆ [N ] and S 6= {∅}. We would show φ′ is also persuasive and achieves at
least the same social welfare as φ. The expected social welfare under φ is∑
θ=0,1,S⊆[N ]
µ(θ)φ(S|θ)W (θ, S)
=
∑
θ=0,1,S⊆[N ]
φ(θ, S)W (θ, S)
=
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(1, S)W (1, S) +
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(0, S)W (0, S)
=
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(1, S)W (1, S)−
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(0, S)
∑
i∈S
r(i)
≤
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(1, S)W (1, S)
=
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ′(1, S)W (1, S) + φ′(0,∅)W (0,∅)
=
∑
θ=0,1,S⊆[N ]
φ′(θ, S)W (θ, S),
which is the social welfare under φ′.
Next, we show (Σ, φ′) satisfies the persuasive constraints (3) and (4). For each agent i, since
φ′(S|0) = 0 for S 6= ∅ and φ′(S|1) = φ(S|1) for any subset S, we have∑
θ,S:i∈S
φ′(θ, S)(θF (|S|)− r(i))
=
∑
S:i∈S
φ′(1, S)(F (|S|)− r(i))
=
∑
S:i∈S
φ(1, S)(F (|S|)− r(i))
≥− r(i)
∑
S:i∈S
φ(0, S) +
∑
S:i∈S
φ(1, S)(F (|S|)− r(i))
=
∑
θ,S:i∈S
φ(θ, S)(θF (|S|)− r(i))
≥0,
where the last inequality is because φ is persuasive. Therefore we have shown (3) holds for agent i.
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On the other hand, for each agent i, we have∑
θ,S:i/∈S
φ′(θ, S)(θF (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
=− r(i)
∑
S:i/∈S
φ′(0, S) +
∑
S:i/∈S
φ′(1, S)(F (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
=− r(i)µ(0) +
∑
S:i/∈S
φ(1, S)(F (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
≤− r(i)
∑
S:i/∈S
φ(0, S) +
∑
S:i/∈S
φ(1, S)(F (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
=
∑
θ,S:i/∈S
φ(θ, S)(θF (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
≤0,
where the first inequality is because
∑
S:i/∈S φ(0, S) ≤ µ(0), and the last inequality holds because φ
is persuasive. Thus we have shown (4) holds for agent i.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let S be the random subset of agents recommended to move under φ. For each agent i, let
Xi = 1{i ∈ S} be the random variable denoting that agent i is recommended to move. Let P and E
denote the probability measure and expectation induced by φ.
Since pik = P(|S| = k, i ∈ S|θ = 1) = P(|S| = k|θ = 1)P(i ∈ S||S| = k, θ = 1), and
k = E
[
N∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣|S| = k, θ = 1
]
=
N∑
i=1
E[Xi||S| = k, θ = 1] =
N∑
i=1
P(i ∈ S||S| = k, θ = 1),
we have
N∑
i=1
pik = P(|S| = k|θ = 1)
N∑
i=1
P(i ∈ S||S| = k, θ = 1) = kP(|S| = k|θ = 1),
and therefore P(|S| = k|θ = 1) = ∑Ni=1 pik/k.
The objective (2) of (LP.1) can be written as
µ(0)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|θ)W (0, S) + µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|θ)W (1, S)
=µ(0)φ(∅|0)W (0,∅) + µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|1)
(
|S|F (|S|)−
∑
i∈S
r(i)
)
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
∑
S:|S|=k
φ(S|1)
(
kF (k)−
∑
i∈S
r(i)
)
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
kF (k)
∑
S:|S|=k
φ(S|1)− µ(1)
N∑
k=1
∑
S:|S|=k
φ(S|1)
∑
i∈S
r(i)
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=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
kF (k)P(|S| = k|θ = 1)− µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
r(i)
∑
S:|S|=k,i∈S
φ(S|1)
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
kF (k)
N∑
i=1
pik
k
− µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
r(i)pik
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik(F (k)− r(i)).
Next, we write the persuasive constraints in terms of the pik’s. For each agent i, the left hand
side of (3) can be written as ∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S:i∈S
φ(S|θ)(θF (|S|)− r(i))
=µ(1)
∑
S:i∈S
φ(S|1)(F (|S|)− r(i))
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
∑
S:|S|=k,i∈S
φ(S|1)(F (k)− r(i))
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
(F (k)− r(i))
∑
S:|S|=k,i∈S
φ(S|1)
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
pik(F (k)− r(i)).
Therefore for agent i, constraint (3) is equivalent as
N∑
k=1
pik(F (k)− r(i)) ≥ 0.
On the other hand, for each agent i, the left hand side of (4) can be written as∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S:i/∈S
φ(S|θ)(θF (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
∑
S:i/∈S
φ(S|1)(F (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
∑
S:|S|=k,i/∈S
φ(S|1)(F (k + 1)− r(i))
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
 ∑
S:|S|=k
φ(S|1)(F (k + 1)− r(i))−
∑
S:|S|=k,i∈S
φ(S|1)(F (k + 1)− r(i))

=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
(F (k + 1)− r(i))
∑
S:|S|=k
φ(S|1)− µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F (k + 1)− r(i))
∑
S:|S|=k,i∈S
φ(S|1)
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
(F (k + 1)− r(i))P(|S| = k|θ = 1)− µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F (k + 1)− r(i))pik
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=− µ(0)r(i)− µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F (k + 1)− r(i))pik + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F (k + 1)− r(i))P(|S| = k|θ = 1)
+ µ(1)(F (1)− r(i))P(|S| = 0|θ = 1)
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F (k + 1)− r(i))(P(|S| = k|θ = 1)− pik)
+ µ(1)(F (1)− r(i))
(
1−
N∑
k=1
P(|S| = k|θ = 1)
)
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F (k + 1)− r(i))
(
N∑
i=1
pik
k
− pik
)
+ µ(1)(F (1)− r(i))
(
1−
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik
k
)
=− µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
1− N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk
 (F (1)− r(i)) + N−1∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk − pik
 (F (k + 1)− r(i))
Therefore for agent i, constraint (4) is equivalent as
−µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
1− N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk
 (F (1)− r(i)) + N−1∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
pjk − pik
 (F (k + 1)− r(i))
 ≤ 0
Proof of Lemma 3.
For any k > 0, [30] presents a sequential elimination subroutine that eliminates one agent from
agents 1, . . . , N at each step, and outputS the remaining k agents, ensuring the probability each
agent i is included in the sample is kpik/
∑N
j=1 pjk, so long as (9) holds for pik’s.
Specifically, at each step n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , k, this subroutine computes pi(i|n) for each
i ∈ [N ] in the following way. It first computes for each i the quantity
npik∑N
j=1 pjk
.
For each agent i such that this quantity is larger than 1, it assigns this quantity to pi(i|n). It then
recomputes this quantity for remaining agents, with the multiplier in the numerator being the
number of remaining agents instead of n. This process is repeated until for all i ∈ [N ], pi(i|n) is in
[0, 1]. After this process, some pi(i|n) is equal to 1 and others are strictly proportional to pik.
This subroutine then computes for each i ∈ [N ]
rni =
{
1− pi(i|n), if n = N − 1;
1− pi(i|n)pi(i|n+1) , if n < N − 1.
For each n, let Sn be the set of remaining agents at the beginning of step n, it can be verified
{rni}i∈Sn is a valid probability distribution, and this subroutine samples one agent according to
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this distribution and eliminate this agent from the pool. If (9) holds, this subroutine ensures after
the final step k, the probability each agent i is included in the sample is kpik/
∑N
j=1 pjk = qik.
The rest of the proof of this lemma is given in the main paper.
Proof of Proposition 1.
First we show F (i∗) ≥ r(i∗). This claim holds trivially when i∗ = 0. Assume i∗ ≥ 1 and assume for
contradiction F (i∗) < r(i∗). We have
W˜ (i∗)− W˜ (i∗ − 1)
=i∗F (i∗)−
i∗∑
j=1
r(j)−
(i∗ − 1)∗F (i∗ − 1)− i∗−1∑
j=1
r(j)

=(i∗ − 1)(F (i∗)− F (i∗ − 1)) + F (i∗)− r(i∗)
≤F (i∗)− r(i∗)
<0.
Therefore i∗ is not maximizer of W˜ , leading to a contradiction.
Let x be the probability distribution over the subsets of [N ] such that x({1, . . . , i∗}) = 1 and
x(S) = 0 for any other S ⊆ [N ]. To show recommending the agents to follow the social optimal
strategy profile is persuasive, it suffices to show x satisfies the constraints of the linear program
(LP.1).
For agent i ≤ i∗, x(S) = 0 for all S such that i /∈ S so the second constraint in (LP.1) is satisfied.
Also,∑
S:i∈S
x(S)(F (|S|)− r(i)) = x({1, . . . , i∗})(F (i∗)− r(i)) = F (i∗)− r(i) ≥ F (i∗)− r(i∗) ≥ 0,
hence the first constraint is also satisfied.
On the other hand, for agent i > i∗, x(S) = 0 for all S such that i ∈ S so the first constraint in
(LP.1) is satisfied. Also, ∑
S:i/∈S
x(S)(F (|S|+ 1)− r(i))
=F (i∗ + 1)− r(i)
≤F (i∗ + 1)− r(i∗ + 1)
≤r(i
∗ + 1)
µ(1)
− r(i∗ + 1)
=
µ(0)
µ(1)
r(i∗ + 1)
≤µ(0)
µ(1)
r(i),
so the second constraint is satisfied. Therefore x is persuasive.
The social welfare corresponding to x is µ(1)W˜ (i∗). Note that for any S ⊆ [N ],
|S|F (|S|)−
∑
i∈S
r(i) ≤ |S|F (|S|)−
|S|∑
i=1
r(i) = W˜ (|S|) ≤ W˜ (i∗).
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Therefore for any signaling scheme φ, the social welfare with respect to φ is
µ(0)
∑
S⊆{[N ]}
φ(S|0)
(
−
∑
i∈S
r(i)
)
+ µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|1)
(
|S|F (|S|)−
∑
i∈S
r(i)
)
≤µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N ]
φ(S|1)W˜ (i∗)
≤µ(1)W˜ (i∗),
hence x gives the optimal signaling mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Since agent i is randomizing between moving and staying in equilibrium, assuming all other agents
follow the given strategy profile, she should be indifferent in moving and staying, hence the expected
payoff for agent i choosing to move should be equal to r(i). Let N−ij be the number of agents who
choose to move besides agent i and j, we have
q(pjE[F (N−ij + 2)] + (1− pj)E[F (N−ij + 1)]) = r(i)
⇒pj = E[F (N−ij + 1)]− r(i)/qE[F (N−ij + 1)− F (N−ij + 2)] .
Similarly, agent j is indifferent in moving and staying given other agents’ strategies, which gives
pi =
E[F (N−ij + 1)]− r(j)/q
E[F (N−ij + 1)− F (N−ij + 2)] . (14)
Since F is decreasing, E[F (N−ij + 1)− F (N−ij + 2)] > 0 and r(i) ≤ r(j) implies pi ≤ pj .
Proof of Lemma 4.
For any t ∈ [i(q), i(q)], let p = t+ 1− dte. We consider the utility for each agent i choosing to move
assuming all other agents follow their strategy in the threshold equilibrium.
For i < dte, agent i’ s expected utility for moving is
q(pF (dte) + (1− p)F (dte − 1)) ≥ qF (dte) ≥ F (i(q)) ≥ r(i(q)) ≥ r(i),
hence she has no incentive to alter her strategy in the threshold equilibrium.
For agent dte, her expected utility for moving is qF (dte). If t > i(q), we have i(q) < dte ≤ i(q),
and by definition of i(q) and i(q), we have qF (dte) = r(dte) so agent dte would not alter her strategy.
On the other hand, if t = i(q), by definition of i(q) we know agent dte would also choose to move,
same as her strategy in the threshold equilibrium.
Finally, for agent i > dte, her expected utility for moving is q(pF (dte+1)+(1−p)F (dte)). In the
case t > i(q), this utility is upper bounded by qF (dte) ≤ qF (i(q) + 1); and in the case t = i(q), we
have p = 1 and the utility for moving is also qF (i(q) + 1). We have qF (i(q) + 1) ≤ r(i(q) + 1) ≤ r(i)
so agent i would not alter her equilibrium strategy, which completes the proof for (i).
The “only if” part is straightforward and we omit the details.
Proof of Theorem 2.
We first prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 5. W (q, n) is concave in n and W (q, i(q)) ≥W (q, i(q) + 1).
Proof. Concavity is straightforward since nF (n) is concave and r(i)’s are increasing in i so
−∑ni=1 r(i) is also concave. To show W (q, i(q)) ≥W (q, i(q) + 1), we have
W (q, i(q) + 1)−W (q, i(q))
=q(i(q) + 1)F (i(q) + 1)−
i(q)+1∑
i=1
r(i)−
qi(q)F (i(q))− i(q)∑
i=1
r(i)

=qi(q)(F (i(q) + 1)− F (i(q))) + qF (i(q) + 1)− r(i(q) + 1)
≤0,
where the inequality is from qF (i(q) + 1) ≤ r(i(q) + 1) and F is decreasing.
Let p = (p1, . . . , pN ) be an arbitrary equilibrium strategy profile under belief q. Define I1, I0 and
Imix as: I1 , {1 ≤ i ≤ N : pi = 1}, I0 , {1 ≤ i ≤ N : pi = 0} and Imix , {1 ≤ i ≤ N : 0 < pi < 1},
denoting the agents who moves, stays and randomizes between moving and staying. Recall W (q, p)
denote the principal’s expected utility with respect to belief q and this strategy profile. We aim to
show W (q, p) ≤W (q, i(q)).
We have
W (q, p) =
∑
S⊆Imix
∏
j∈S
pj
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1− pj)
q(|S|+ |I1|)F (|S|+ |I1|)− ∑
j∈I1∪S
r(j)

≤
∑
S⊆Imix
∏
j∈S
pj
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1− pj)
q(|S|+ |I1|)F (|S|+ |I1|)− |I1|+|S|∑
j=1
r(j)
 (15)
=
|Imix|∑
n=0
q(|I1|+ n)F (|I1|+ n)− |I1|+n∑
j=1
r(j)
 ∑
S⊆Imix:|S|=n
∏
j∈S
pj
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1− pj)
=
|Imix|∑
n=0
W (q, |I1|+ n)
∑
S⊆Imix:|S|=n
∏
j∈S
pj
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1− pj).
The inequality is from that r(i)’s are increasing in i. Let X be the number of agents in Imix that
chooses to move. The right-hand side of the last equality of (15) equals E[W (q, |I1|+X)]. Since W
is concave, by Jensen’s inequality we have
E[W (q, |I1|+X)] ≤W (q, |I1|+ E[X]). (16)
Therefore, U(p1, . . . , pN ) ≤W (q, |I1|+ E[X]). Next, we show |I1|+ E[X] ≥ i(q) in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. |I1|+ E[X] ≥ i(q).
Proof. Define G(n) , qF (n), n ∈ [N ]. Since G is convex, by Jensen’s inequality, we have
G(|I1|+ E[X] + 1) ≤ E[G(|I1|+X + 1)]. (17)
For any agent i ∈ I0, her expected utility if she chooses to move is E[G(|I1|+X + 1)]. Since she
prefers staying, we have E[G(|I1|+X+1)] ≤ r(i). On the other hand, for any agent i ∈ Imix, let X(i)
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denote the number of agents in Imix besides agent i who chooses to move. Agent i’s expected utility
if she chooses to move is E[G(|I1|+X(i) + 1)]. Since agent i is indifferent in moving and staying,
we have E[G(|I1|+X(i) + 1)] = r(i). Clearly X(i) 4sd X where “sd” denotes first-order stochastic
dominance, and since G is a decreasing function, we have G(|I1|+X + 1) 4sd G(|I1|+X(i) + 1).
Therefore E[G(|I1|+X + 1)] ≤ E[G(|I1|+X(i) + 1)] = r(i). Summarizing the above, we have
E[G(|I1|+X + 1)] ≤ min
i∈I0∪Imix
r(i). (18)
Let j , min I0 ∪ Imix and we show it must hold that j ≤ i(q). Assume, for contradiction, j > i(q).
First observe that since j is the agent in I0 ∪ Imix with the smallest index, it must hold j ≤ |I1|+ 1,
which implies |I1| ≥ j − 1 ≥ i(q). Meanwhile, if j ∈ I0, we have r(j) = E[G(|I1| + X(j) + 1)] ≤
G(|I1|+ 1); and if j ∈ Imix, we have r(j) ≤ E[G(|I1|+X + 1)] ≤ G(|I1|+ 1). Therefore,
r(i(q) + 1) ≤ r(j) ≤ G(|I1|+ 1) ≤ G(i(q) + 1).
However by definition of i(q) it must be that G(i(q)+1) < r(i(q)+1), which leads to a contradiction.
From j ≤ i(q), along with (17) and (18), we have
G(|I1|+ E[X] + 1) ≤ E[G(|I1|+X + 1] ≤ r(j) ≤ r(i(q)).
By definition of i(q) we have G(i(q)) ≥ r(i(q)). In the case G(i(q)) > r(i(q)), we have G(i(q)) >
G(|I1|+ E[X] + 1) hence |I1|+ E[X] + 1 > i(q) since G is decreasing. Note when G(i(q)) > r(i(q)),
i(q) = i(q), so we have |I1| + E[X] ≥ i(q). On the other hand, if G(i(q)) = r(i(q)), we have
i(q) < i(q) so |I1|+ E[X] + 1 ≥ i(q) > i(q) and we also get |I1|+ E[X] ≥ i(q).
By Lemma 5, W (i) is decreasing on i ≥ i(q). Since |I1|+E[X] ≥ i(q) we have W (q, |I1|+E[X]) ≤
W (q, i(q)). Along with (15), (16) and Lemma 6 we have
W (q, p) ≤ E[W (q, |I1|+X)] ≤W (q, I1|+ E[X]) ≤W (q, i(q)),
completing the proof.
B Upper Bound of µ(1)
In this section, we compute the upper bound r(i∗ + 1)/F (i∗ + 1) for µ(1) given in Proposition 1,
which ensures recommending the agents following the social optimal strategy profile is persuasive,
for several typical resource sharing functions and cost structures.
Specifically, we consider cost function F (i) = 1/iα for α = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, with different α
controlling the curvature of F and representing different resource sharing scenarios. We consider 3
different cost structures: constant costs , linear costs, and quadratic costs. We fix the total number
of agents N = 20 since i∗ does not depend on N . The result is given in Table 1.
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α
r
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.811 0.808
0.4 1 1 1 0.621 0.628 0.653 0.666 0.696 0.698 0.776
0.6 1 0.422 0.44 0.459 0.483 0.58 0.531 0.606 0.682 0.758
0.8 0.237 0.241 0.261 0.348 0.435 0.522 0.609 0.696 0.783 0.871
(a) Resource sharing function F (i) = 1/iα, with constant costs r(i) = 0.5r.
α
r
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 1 1 0.836 0.869 0.888 0.838 0.849 0.826 0.93 0.859
0.4 0.617 0.648 0.65 0.735 0.762 0.737 0.666 0.761 0.857 0.696
0.6 0.464 0.45 0.527 0.525 0.459 0.551 0.643 0.464 0.521 0.58
0.8 0.252 0.243 0.364 0.289 0.361 0.433 0.506 0.279 0.313 0.348
(b) Resource sharing function F (i) = 1/iα, with linear costs r(i) = 0.1ri.
α
r
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 0.891 0.947 0.951 1 0.97 0.868 1 0.824 0.927 1
0.4 0.631 0.78 0.64 0.854 0.737 0.885 0.666 0.761 0.857 0.952
0.6 0.446 0.63 0.633 0.525 0.657 0.441 0.515 0.588 0.662 0.735
0.8 0.302 0.362 0.291 0.388 0.485 0.26 0.303 0.347 0.39 0.433
(c) Resource sharing function F (i) = 1/iα, with quadratic costs r(i) = 0.02ri2.
Table 1: The upper bound r(i∗ + 1)/F (i∗ + 1) of µ(1) for the private signaling mechanism that recommends
every agent to stay when θ = 0 and recommends the first i∗ agents to move when θ = 1 to be optimal, given
by Proposition 1, for different resource sharing functions and cost structures.
C Additional Computational Results
In this section, we present computational results on how much social welfare can be generated
by the optimal private and public signaling mechanism under different priors. We consider three
different resource sharing function F (i) = 1/iα for α = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9; and three different cost
structures: constant costs where r(i) = 0.5r, linear costs where r(i) = 0.1ri and quadratic costs
where r(i) = 0.02ri2, and r is the cost coefficient. The results are given in Figure 2.
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(a) Constant costs: r(i) = 0.5r.
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(b) Linear costs: r(i) = 0.1ri.
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(c) Quadratic costs: r(i) = 0.02ri2.
Figure 2: Social welfare of the optimal signaling mechanisms and the benchmarks, under different prior
beliefs, for different resource sharing and cost functions. In all experiments, N = 20.
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